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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DOYLE L. ALLRED, Adlninistrator
of the Estate of James F. Allred, det•t·a~Pd,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

\"OX.AL ALLRED and AGXI~S ALLhusband and wife,
Defendant and Respondent,
and
ISABELL ALLRED,
Plaintiff in Intervention and
Respondent.

\ Civil Xo. 9980

RI~~D,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATE~[EXT

OF THE CA.SE

This case involYes an action by the Administrator
of the Estate of J mnes F. Allred, deceased, and certain
heirs, to cancel and rescind the deliYery by an escrow
agent to t1~e Defendants of certain conveyances of propt.•rt~· and to deterinine the balance owing by said Defendants on the purchase price of said property.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Upon the trial of the case, at which all the material
facts were· stipulated to, the District Court, sitting without a jury, detennined that during his lifethne James F.
Allred and his wife, Isabell Allred (Plaintiff in Intervention) created a joint tenancy between themselves
in the property in question subject to the contract of
sale therefore entered into by them with Defendants,
so that upon the death of James F. Allred, his surviving
widow, Isabell, becan1e the sole owner of the property
and entitled to authorize the release of the instruments
of conveyance by the escrow agent notwithstanding the
fact that the Defendants had not paid the full purchase
price required by the contract of sale; that upon the delivery of the instruments of conveyance by the escrow
holder pursuant to authorization from Isabell Allred the
Defendants obtained title to the property without being
required to pay the balance owing on the contract of sale.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This appeal is taken by Doyle L. Allred, Administrator of the Estate of James F. Allred, deceased, one of the
Plaintiffs. Appellant seeks to have this Court determine
that upon the death of James L. Allred, Isabell Allred
did not become vested with all interest in and to the property, subject to the contract of sale to Defendants, and
that she could not authorize and direct the escrow agent
to deliver the instruments of conveyance unless and until
the full purchase price for the property had been paid
by Defendants in accordance with the terms of the

2
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original rontract; that the contract being in default at
the tintt· of the death of J amPs Allred, his estate is entitled to t--xercise any default provisions therein provided
fot'.
STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

The facts in this case are that James F. Allred and
Isabell Allred were husband and wife and resided at
Cleveland, Utah. ~Ir. Allred operated a farm and livestock setup. On ~lay 27, 1958, they entered into a sales
agreement with \Tonal Allred and Agnes Allred, their son
tmd daughter-in-law, selling to them land, water stock,
grazing permits, livestock and farm machinery for the
~lUll of $17,000.00 to be paid in annual installments of
$1,000.00 on the first day of December of each year beginning December 1, 1959. No interest was to be charged
on the unpaid balances. This docmnent is set forth in
full in the request for admissions of the plaintiff in intervention. (Since the record is not numbered, it is impossible to refer to the specific pages therein. See, howt~\·Pr, Tr. pp. 6, 7 for reference to the contract.) This
agreement provides that the deed and water stock and the
bill of sale on the personal property should be placed
m escrow.
Four days later on ~fay 31, 1958, James F. Allred
and Isabell Allred signed a letter of escrow instructions
to A. John Ruggeri and placed these instruments of conveyance and the contract of sale with hun as part of the
l'~erow. (See Record, Tr. p. 7)
The purchasers 1nade the $1000.00 payment due December 1. 1959, but did not make the payment due DecemSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ber 1, 1960, J mnes F. Allred, one of the vendors died on
February 24, 1961 (Tr. p. 7).
At the time J mnes F. Allred died there was due on
said contract $16,000.00 with one payment of $1000.00
delinquent.
On April 5, 1961, the surviving wife of James ] 1 •
Allred, Isabell Allred, signed a document entitled Release of Escrow Paper directed to A. John Ruggeri, ('Hcrow agent, directing hi1n to deliver to the purchasers
V onal Allred and Agnes A.llred the \V arranty Deed, the
stock certificate on the water stock, the Bill of ~ale on the
livestock and fann machinery and the transfer of the
grazing permits. She certified in this letter that the full
purchase price of $17,000.00 had been paid and that all
conditions precedent to the delivery of the escrow papers
had been performed. Actually there was still $16,000.00
due on this contract. (Tr. p. 7)
The letter of instructions to the escrow agent dated
.May 31, 1958, and also the release of escrow papers dated
April 5, 1961, are set forth in full in the request for admissions of plaintiff-in-intervention and are contained
in the Record on Appeal.
Thereafter, son1e of the children of J an1es F. Allred,
deceased, filed this action in the District Court of Emery
County against V onal Allred and Agnes Allred, husband
and wife, requesting the District Court to set aside the
delivery of conveyances of real and personal property
to the Defendants, and also asking the Distrjct Court to
detennine the balance due on the sales agreen1ent and for
4
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n •·econveyanre back to the estate of James F. Allred,
dt•{'(•asPd, and to his surviving wife, Isabell Allred. Imnwdiat~ly after the Cmnplaint was filed a petition was
fi!t·d to appoint Doyle L. Allred as Administrator of
tlw 1-:statP of J a1nes F. Allred, deceased. This was done
and thP Adininistrator of the James F. Allred Estate was
made an additional party plaintiff.
After the defendants, Vonal Allred and Agnes Allred, filed their answer, Isabell Allred petitioned the Court
for lean• to intervene. Leave was given her to intervene
and ::;h1• filed her Complaint in Intervention, wherein
sht• set forth that she was the surviving joint tenant
under the contract of sale and entitled to receive all of
the proceeds upon the death of her husband James F.
Allred, and that she directed the escrow agent to release
tlw papers held by him to V onal and Agnes Allred.
In her answer to interrogatories, Isabell Allred,
plaintiff-in-intervention, stated that she and her deceased
hnshand had received or had had applied for their benefit
tlw total su1n of $3,059.02 and that the balance of the
purchase price had been acquitted. (See Record)
~-\t

the trial of the case the Defendants Vonal Allred
and ~\gnPs Allred, tendered receipts totaling $3,145.10,
which were received in evidence by the Court. (Tr. p. 29)
This amount included the $1000.00 paid December 1, 1959,
and the balance was represented by the payment of last
i lhwss and burial expenses of James F. Allred, deceased,
and the payn1ent of $611.83 to the Carbon Emery Bank
which tlH:'Y claitned was an encumbrance against the water
stork.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Plaintiff in intervention filed a n1otion for summary
judgment which was heard and denied by the Court.
There was a pretrial on February 18, 1963, and a Pretrial
Order prepared and signed by the Court setting forth the
issues. (See Record.) The trial was held on April 29,
1963. Frmn an adverse decision at the trial plaintiffs
filed a 1notion for a new trial and to a1nend the findings
and decree. (See Record.) The Court denied the motion
for a new trial and the motion to an1end the decree. (Tr.
p. 90) The Court did grant the motion to amend the
findings to show that there had only been one payment of
$1000.00 made on Dece1nber 1, 1959, and that a payment
of $1,000.00 was delinquent when James F. Allred died
and there was a balance due on the contract of $16,000.00
at the time of his death. (Tr. p. 86, 87) Mr. Hobbs was
directed by the Court to 1nake the amendment to the original findings (Tr. p. 87); but the record now on appeal
fails to show that such a1nendment was made.
The evidence submitted to the Court and on which
the Court 1nade its determination was documentary and
appears in the Record attached to the Requests for AdInissions or as Answers to Interrogatories. (Tr. p. 20)
It was agreed by counsel at pretrial that the property
sold to V onal and Agnes Allred was owned by James F.
Allred and Isabell Allred in three different types of
ownership. All of the water stock, livestock, and personal
property was owned by Jan1es F. Allred, individually.
Part of the land was owned by J runes F. Allred, individually, and part by Isabell Allred, individually, and part
of the land was owned by the two of the1n as joint tenants. (Tr. p. 46) These instruments of ownership appear
6
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n:-; Exhibits to the answPrs by Defendants to Plaintiffs'
Interrogatories; and the trial court made a finding to
this effect. (Tr. p. 62)
The trial court determined in its Conclusions of Law
that "the execution of the contract of sale by
.James F. Allred and Isabell Allred on May 27,
1958, constituted an equitable conversion of their
interests in the real and personal property subject of the said contract of sale to an interest in
personalty, being the proceeds due them under
the said contract of sale."
The court further concluded that "by the execution
of the letter of instructions to A. John Ruggeri as
escrow agent, and by execution and delivery of
instruments of conveyance of the property subject
of the contract of sale to the escrow agent, the
said James F. Allred and Isabell Allred created
between themselves a joint tenancy in their property interests as sellers under the contract of sale."
In consequence of the foregoing the court determined
that upon the death of James F. Allred the surviving
widow became the sole owner of the right to receive the
proceeds from the contract of sale and could waive the
performance by the purchasers of the conditions of the
contract; that no interest in either the real property or
the proceeds to be derived from the sale thereof passed
to the estate.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE
OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION.

The court below upheld what was in effect a gift
from Isabell Allred to the Defendants of substantially
all of the property owned by the deceased, James F. AllSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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red, prior to the execution of the agreement of sale,
even though such a gift was obviously contrary to the
intention of decedent as expressed in the letter of escrow
instruction, and even though, the net result thereof would
be substantially to disinherit the other children. In arriving at its decision, the court invoked the doctrine of
equitable conversion. Appellant contends that the results
of the decision are repugnant to fundamental concepts
of equity, and that the court below erred in applying
the doctrine of equitable conversion to accmnplish such
inequitable results.
The authorities are in agreement that the doctrine
of equitable conversion does not apply when inequitable
results follow from its application. In an early case applying the doctrine, the U. S. Supreme Court said:
"The doctrine of equitable conversion is based
on the principle that equity regards things directed or agreed to be done as having been actually
performed where nothing has intervened which
ought to prevent a perfonnance. . .. If something
has intervened which ought to prevent it, the doctrine of equitable conversion will not be applied.
It does not exist as a matter of right and is not
applicable to all circumstances. It is a fiction invented by co1trts to be applied only zchen necessary and j11stice requires its exercise." (Emphasis
added.) (Craig v. Leslie, 3 \Vheat 563, 16 U.S.
563, 4 L. Ed. 560)
In Schneider v. Schneider, 135 Kan. 734, 12 P2d 834,
836, the court stated:
"As pointed out in the Yerkes case, it is not
a rule of right; hence it is not one which can be
invoked under all circu1nstances. It is designed to
H
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promote equity, heneP it should not be used as a
basis to accmnplish inequitable results."
The tenden<·~· of courts to overlook the fact that
t>ttuitable <'<>nversion does not apply as a fixed rule of
law iH rPeognized hy the court in r erkes v. Yerkes, 200
I ,u. 419, 50 A. 186, where the court stated:
"Its application requires constant watchfulto guard against the tendency to become a
formal rule de jure without regard to its real
purpose and necessity. It should never be overlooked that there is no real conversion. The propPrty remains all the time in fact realty or personalty. As it was, but for the purpose of the will,
so far as it may be necessary, and only so far, it is
treated in contemplation of law as if it had been
converted."
tw~~

It ~PPlllS clear that one of the fundamental purposes
of the doctrine of equitable conversion is to carry out the
intent of the parties to a contract. In Inghram v. Chandler, 179 Iowa 304, 161 N."\V. 434, L.R.A. 1917D, 713, the
ronrt

~tatPs:

"The real purpose of the doctrine of equitable
conversion is to give effect to the manifest intent
of a testator or vendor and to treat that as done
which, by will, the testator has directed to be done
or that which, by previous contract with another,
both have mutually bound themselves to do. Its
application is always withheld if it should appear
to foil the intent of the testator or to u·ork inJustice in tl1e particular case.''
In 19 Am. J u r. "Equitable Conversion" Section 4.
the following observation is made:
"The purpose of the doctrine of equitable
conversion is to give effect to the intention of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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testator, settlor, or contracting parties, and will
not be given an effect contrary to such intention."
Appellant submits that, in its use of the doctrine of
equitable conversion, the lower court did not carry out
decedent's intent but frustrated it. In his escrow letter
of instruction, James Allred provided the 1uethod by
which the defendants could acquire the property in question, at the same time reserving the right to cancel the
contract for any default in the payment of the purchase
price. The net effect of the decision of the lower court
was to uphold a gift of such property to the Defendant
by ~Irs. Allred. The court reasoned that she was the sole
owner of the property by right of survivorship and could
dispose of it as she saw fit. However, Appellant directs
this Court's attention to the fact that the conversion effected by the application of the doctrine of equitable
conversion was an indispensible step in the lower court's
conclusion that a joint tenancy existed between James
and Isabell Allred.
First, it was necessary to satisfy the requirement
that for the creation of a joint tenancy, there must be
unity of interest, title, tilne and possession. Since there
had been separate and jointly held property mixed together, which did not satisfy the four-unities requirement,
it was necessary to invoke the doctrine of equitable conversion to establish a cmnmon interest in a fund.
Second, the conversion of the property from realty
to personalty was necessary to circu1nvent the statutory
poHcy expressed in Section 57-1-5, UCA 1953, which limits
joint tenancies in real property to those clearly Pxpressed
to be such.
10
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Appellant contends that but for the application of
tlw doctrine of equitable conversion the court would not
havP btoen able to find that a joint tenancy had been crentPd. Thus, the determination by the court below that
~lr~. Allred had the sole ownership as the surviving
joint tenant of all the property under the contract, and
that shP could do with such property as she saw fit, was
made possible only by the application of the doctrine of
equitable conversion. Appellant contends that the doctrine cannot be employed to accomplish such results and
that the decision of the Court below must be reversed,
because it reiies on an equitable concept that is inapplirable where the results following from its use are inequitable.
Appellant further contends that the court below erred
in holding that the doctrine of equitable conversion applied in this matter, because at the time of the death of
J runes Allred the conditions necessary for the application of the doctrine did not exist. (The court found that,
at the time of James' death, the Defendants were in default on the agreement.)
The doctrine of equitable conversion is based on the
maxim of equity-that equity will regard as done that
which ought to be done. McClintock on Eqttity, Hornbook Series ( 2d Ed) Section 106 states :
"Equitable conversion is the doctrine that
equity will, in certain cases, treat interests in land
as though the land had already been converted
into personal property. It is based on the maxim
that equity regards that as done which ought to
be done, and applies wherever there is created by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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will, contract, or court order an obligation to sell
land. While that obligation continues in force,
equity generally will adjudicate the rights of the
parties as they would have been if the conveyance
had actually been made."
In con1menting on the meaning of the equity maxim
underlying the doctrine of equitable conversion, Pomeroy
states:

"In the first place, it should be observed that
the principle involves the notion of an equitable
obli.qation existing from smne cause; of a present
relation of equitable right held by one party, from
whatever cause arising, that the other should do
some act, and the corresponding duty, the ou_qht
resting upon the latter to do such act. Equity does
not regard and treat as done what might be done,
or what could be done, but only what ought to be
done. Nor does the principle operate in favor of
every person, no matter what may be his situation
and relations, but only in favor of him who holds
the equitable right to have the act performed, as
against the one upon whom the duty of such performance has devolved.'' (Emphasis added.)
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) Ser.tion 365, p. 678.
The doctrine does not apply in the absence of an
obligation which satisfies the "ought" requirement of the
definition. Thus, where the thing agreed to be done,
ought not to be done, the doctrine does not apply. 19
.:lm. Jttr. "Equitable Conversion," Sec. 2, states:
"Equitable conversion ... i:s a mere fiction
resting upon the principle that equity regards
things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has inter-

12
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rt·ned whil'h ou,qhf to prcrt'llf such a performauce.
(Emphasis added.)

In furtht>r support of the requirement that the
··ought" dement n1ust be satisfied before the doctrine
applicH, it Inust be noted that Inany authorities and cases
have indicated that siinilar principles govern the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion as govern
that of the equitable remedy of specific performance. In
Clay l'. Landreth, 45 S.E. 2d 875, 175 ALR 104, the court
states:
"Principles similar to those which govern the
enforcement of specific enforcement underlie the
application of equitable conversion. In both cases
the equitable doctrines and their limitations are
well defined and stem from the same equitable
source. Neither will specific performance of a
contract be decreed nor equitable conversion applied if, by doing so, hardship and injustice are
forced upon the parties through a change in circmnstances not contemplated by them when the
contract was made."
19 A 111. .J u r. "Equitable Conversion" Section 11
states:
" . . . The qttestion in such cases is whether
at the time of his death, the vendor or pttrchaser,
a.s the case may be, 1ca.s either absolutely or contingently under such an agreement as equity would
enforce against him. A conversion is permitted,
however, if, due to default of title, insufficiency
of contract, or other cause, the court shmtld feel
that the contract ought not to be executed. The
estate, in such an instance, will go to the heir at
the laze of the vendor, jttst as tho'ltgh no contract
had e1·er e.risted. (Emphasis added)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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See also Horton v. Horton, 2 N.J.S. 155, 62 A.2d 503,
504, where the court observed:
"The test of the application of the doctrine
of equitable conversion is whether the contract is
capable of enforcement by specific performance."
Since the Defendants were in default on the contract
m the amount of $1000.00 at the time of the death of
James Allred, the latter had a right to forfeit the interest
for such a default. Upon the death of :Mr. Allred, his
estate had a matured right to cancel the contract and
regain possession of the property. Thus it can hardly
be said that as of the time of his death James Allred
was under any obligation to convey to the Defendant
and the ''ought'' requirement is not satisfied. During
such a breach, specific performance would likewise be
unavailable.
The rule seems clear that the time that is material
in determining whether the doctrine of equitable conversion applies is the time of the death of one party to the
contract. See 19 A1n. Jur. ''Equitable Conversion" Section 11:
"The question in such cases is whether at the
time of his death, the vendor or purchaser as the
case 1nay be, was either absolutely or contingently
under such an agreement as equity would enforce
against him."
In further support of the proposition that the time
of the execution of the contract is not the n1aterial time
in determining whether equitable conversion applies,
:McClintock states :
"The rights of the parties as affected by the
happening of any event subsequent to the making

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the contract are to be deter1nined by the binding effect of the contract at the time the event
oe<'nrred. Where the contract was specifically

enforceable at the time of the death of one of the
parties, the fact that it has since become unenforceable does not affect the rights of the parties
or their successors, as they existed at the time of
the death." (Emphasis added.) (McClintock on
Equity (1948), Section 106, p. 287)
Thus, though equitable conversion, if found to apply
according to the general rule, will be dated from the
execution of the agreement, the court will look to the time
of tlw death of the party to deter1nine whether or not
it actually applies.
See, also, Liberty National Bank of Washington v.
Smoot, (Dist. D.C.) 135 F. Supp. 654, in support of this
proposition.
Appellant contends that the court below erred in
finding that the doctrine of equitable conversion appli~d, in the absence of a specifically enforceable agreement, as of the time of James Allred's death.
The agreement of sale executed May 27, 1958, at
page 4 contained a clause, set off in capital letters, which
~tated that "TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE TO THIS
AGREE~IENT." Where such a clause exists, there is
also authority for the position that the doctrine of equitable conversion does not apply. In the case of Douglas
r. U.P.R.R., 5 l{an. 615 (Precedes Pacific Reporter) the
court states:
"In equity there is a maxim that equity will
consider as done that which ought to be done,
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and that it will look upon all things agreed to be
done as actually performed.... But this ma.rim
never applies where time is of the essence of the
contract, and where the land is subject to absolute forfeiture on failure of some co11dition of
the sale being perform,ed; for there is no necrssity
in such a case for courts of equity to resort to any
s u.ch fiction.'' (Emphasis added)
See also Standard Lumber Co. v. illiller & Vidor
Lumber Co., 21 Okla. 617, 96 P. 761.
Furthermore, it seems clear that where an agreement
contains a clause making time of the essence and a party
has failed to perforn1 in accordance with such clause, specific perfonnance will not be available to him. 49 Am.
J ur. summarizes the rule as follows:
"Time may be made of the essence of the contract by express stipulation, or even without an
express stipulation to that effect where such intention is clearly Inanifested from the agreement
as a whole. In either case, the court may refuse to
decree specific performance where it appears that
the plaintiff failed to perform on his part within
the stipulated time, unless there is something in
the facts to take the case out of the usual rule."
(49 Am. Jur. "Specific Performance," Section 42)
Appellant further subn1its that the court below erred
in applying the doctrine of equitable conversion when
by such application the statutory policy of Section
57-1-5 UCA 1953, disfayoring joint, tenancy would thereby be circu1nvented. There is good authority in support
of the rule that the doctrine of equitable conversion will
not apply ·where it interferes with the policy of the state
16
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forth in its ~tatutes. In Pond v. Porter, 1-!1 Conn.
1.-~~ i, 10-! A. ~d ~~S, ~:33, the court denied the application
of the doctrine of equitable conversion when it would
interft~re with the Connecticut statute regarding perpetuitil':-i. The court stated:

as

:;d

", .. the doctrine of equitable conversion is
not a fixed rule of law, but proceeds upon equitable principles which take into account the result
which its application will accomplish ... If, therefore, we assume that under New York law the
bequest over to the issue of Clara Pond Porter
would be valid, the application of the doctrine
of equitable conversion would result in the nullifying of the public policy of this state. Certainly
the doctrine ought not to be applied to accomplish
that result. It would be inequitable. In passing
upon the validity of the testatrix' attempted disposition of the remainder interest in the Connecticut property, we must continue to treat the
property as real estate and therefore subject to
the law of the state."
In Xatioua.l Bank of Topeka v. Saia, 154 l(an. 739,
1:21 P.:2d 251, :25-!, the court refused to apply the doctrine
of ~quitable conversion where the effect would have been
to cut off the equity of redemption of another party.
:Since this 1natter appears to be one of first impression in l~tah, the Court's attention is directed to the
~trong minority position which denies the doctrine of
equitable conversion per se to installment land contracts.
In following this doctrine the court in Brown v. Thomas,
37 Kan. :2:3:2, :286, 15 P. 211, 213 stated:
"The 1naxin1 that equity considers, when land
is sold on credit, and the deed is to be made when
the purchase money is paid, that the land at the
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time of the purchase becmnes the vendee's, and the
purchase 1noney the vendor's, and that the vendor
becomes the trustee of the vendee with respect
to the land, and the vendee the trustee of the
vendor with respect to the purchase n1oney is not
applicable here.... The legal title has not passed
to him (the vendee) because no deed or other conveyance has yet been made; and the equitable
title has not passed, because the land has not been
paid for, and because-on account of the proYisions for forfeiture-it is clearly the intention of
the parties, as indicated in the contract, that such
title shall not pass until the land is paid for."
See also: ~~lcClintock on Equity, Section 106, p. 287,
w·hich states :
"In some jurisdictions, it is held that the
relationship does not exist so long as the contract
can be terminated for non-payment of future installments of the purchase price and that the
conversion does not occur until the last installment
is paid."
See also: Pickens 1'. Campbell (1919) 104 Kan. 425,
179 P. 343; Lansford v. Gloyd (1923) 89 Okla. 232, 215
P. 198: Tieton Hotel Co. v. Manheim (1913) 75 Wash.
641, 135 p. 658.
Appellant further submits that the lower court erred
in invoking the doctrine as a means of determining the
intervivos rights and interests of James and Isabell
who were co-grantors on the contract of sale. The doctrine applies only in those situations where, by contract,
rights and duties are created between the parties. It
would seen1 to be improper to make use of the doctrine
to detennine the intervivos rights of certain parties, as
18
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hu:-;lmnd and wife in thi~ ca:-;P. The doctrine applies only

the vendors and the vendeP in such a contract,
and not bPtwel·n co-vPndors. In support of this statement
~we Pomeroy, Equity Jurispnulcw·c, (4th Ed.) Section
3(i;}:
'"Equity does not regard and treat as done
what 1night be done, or what could be done, but
only what ought to be done. l\T or does the principle
operate in favor of every person, no matter 1chat
may be his situation and relations, but only in
faror of him who holds the equitable right to have
the act performed, as against the one upon u'lwm
thl' duty of such performance has devol·ted."
(Emphasis added.)
lu•twePn

In conclusion, Appellant refers the Court to the
Findings of Fact which give no basis for involving the
doctrine of equitable conversion.
POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
LETTER OF ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS CREATED A JOINT
TENANCY WITH FULL RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP .

•\s a rP:~mlt of a legislative policy disfavoring the
crPation of joint tenancies, where an estate is transferred
to two or n1ore 1)eople, there is a presun1ption that a common tenancy is created. -tS CJ S 918 summarizes the law
as follows:
'"Under the modern practice and statutory
rules ... the common-law presun1ption that it was
the intention of the parties to the transfer of an
estate to two or more persons to create a joint
tenancy is replaced by the contrary presumption;
that the parties intended to create a tenancy in
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ly, where the instrument is silent or ambiguous
as to the nature of the joint estate created, it
will be construed as creating a tenancy in common
and not a joint tenancy. A construction of an instrument as creating a joint tenancy is to be avoided, but the presumption against a joint tenancy
is rebuttable."
In Utah, the legislature has in several instances by
statute established a presumption of common tenancy.
Section 57-1-5 UCA 1953 creates a presumption of common tenancy in transfers or conveyances of real estate to
two or more people unless a joint tenancy is otherwise
expressly declared. Section 60-1-6 UCA 1953 creates a
tenancy in common when undivided shares of goods are
conveyed to two or more persons. Section 7-3-45 UCA
1953, dealing with joint bank accounts, establishes special
language for the creation of a joint tenancy in a bank
account. In addition to the above statutes, and the modern common law rule establishing a presumption of tenancy in common, there is the equitable rule previously
cited favoring the creation of tenancies in common.
Based on the above statutes, the common law (adopted as the law in this state) and the equitable rule heretofore referred to, it is the law in Utah that a tenancy in
comrnon is created by a transfer to two or rnore persons,
unless there is express language creating a joint tenancy.
Since the court below determined that a joint tenancy
was created, we must look to the findings to determine
the basis therefor. In its Finding No. 4, the court finds
that the instruments of conveyance
"
. should be delivered to the purchaser~
therein, the defendants Yonal Allred and Agnes

20
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Allred, if and when the purchase price shall have
been paid in full to the said J runes F. Allred, de<·eased, and the plaintiff in intervention, Isabell
Allred, or to the survivor of them."
lf this Court determines that the doctrine of equitable
l'OilVPrsion was erroneously invoked below, and that Section i)'i -1-3 UCA 1953 applies to the creation of a joint
tenancy, then Appellant submits that the conditions of
the statute are not satisfied. The statute provides two
methods for the creation of a joint tenancy in real estate:

"A sole owner of real property shall create
a joint tenancy in himself and another or others
by making a transfer to himself and such other
or others as joint tenants by use of such words
. as herein provided OR by conveying to another
person or persons an interest in land in which an
interest is retained by the grantor and by declaring the creation of a joint tenancy by use of such
words as herein provided. In all cases the interest
of joint tenants n1ust be equal and undivided."
( En1phasis added)
ln any event, regardless of the mechanics adopted,
a joint tenancy in real estate can be created only by a
conrcya uce or a transfer. The letter of escrow instructions is not pr01nissory in character, nor do such instructions constitute an instrument norn1ally intended to he
a grant of interest between co-vendors of the related contract. The letter of escrow instruction does not satisf~·
the definition of conveyance set forth in Section 57-1-1
rcA 1953, nor does it satisfy the definition of "transfer."
In the early case of Ober v. Schenck, 23 "Ctah 614, 65 P.
101:~. the Court indicated that the term "transfer," when
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used in its ordinary sense, is applicable to real property
and is either synonymous with the word sale or imports
something more than, or subsequent to, sale. As used in
Section 57-1-5 [;TCA 19'53 the tel'ln "transfer" would seem
to imply an unequivocal and unconditional grant to another, which is not the case under the escrow instructions.
Even if this Court should determine that the doctrine
of equitable conversion should be invoked and that tlw
interest of James and Isabella Allred becmne an interest
in personalty, then, Appellant alternatively submits that
the letter of escrow instructions by its nature was not
adequate to create a joint tenancy, regardless of the language appearing therein. Language alone is not the sole
test of the creation of a joint tenancy. The instrument
itself in which the language is contained is also 1naterial.
Indeed, it is the accepted rule that a joint tenancy can
arise only by a grant or a det:ise. 14 Am. Jur. ''Cotenancy" section 11 states :
"A distinguishing characteristic of the estate
in joint tenancy is the circumstance that it arises
solely by way of grant or devise . . . . "
Appellant submits that the letter of escrow instruction
is not in the nature of either a grant or a devise, but is
merely what it purports to be-a letter of instruction to
the escrow agent.
This Court, in Tangen 'C. Ingalls, 12 U. 2d 388, 367
P.2d 179, in dealing with a question relating to a joint
bank aecount, recognized that the nature of the instruInent lwaring the language alleged to create a joint ten-
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mwy m personalty is 111aterial. At page 390 of that
opinion this Court stated:

··Another factor having an iinportant bearing
on the rights of the parties inter-se is that the
dt>posit card is basically an agreement with the
bank. It is prepared by the bank, is signed by the
parties at its request, and for the bank's protection. Therefore, its recitals need not necessarily
he n~garded primarily as an agreement between
the parties, nor reflect the true relationship between them."
If the r<>citals of the bank deposit card are not an
lwtwPPn the signers thereof, and not "reflectin· of the true relationship between them," then it would
seem a fortiori that the recitals of an escrow letter of
instruction, intended as the fulfillment of a prior contract
t'\lY<'nant, and usually conditional on the performance of
i'Prtain conditions by the other party, must be an even
le~~ reliable indication of the true relationship intended
h~tween the parties.
a~reement

A close look at the nature of the letter of instruction
n•veals that it is not appropriate for the creation of a
joint tenancy because the property which is the subject
of the escrow and the subject of the alleged joint tenancy
may lw retaken in the event the purchasers fail to perform the conditions of the contract. In such a case, the
subject Inatter of the intended joint tenancy is regained
hy the co-vendors and the sale contract is voided. It would
not ~t)Pm correct to allow the creation of a joint tenancy
by a writing that was conditional in its operation and
eonspquently lacking in the finality associated with an
in:4rument ha\ing the effect of a grant. The language
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relied on by the lower court see1ns to have been casually
used as one step in the chain of buying or selling real
estate. Furthernwre, because escrow instructions an·
often executed by the parties as necessary acts in perfonnance of the earlier agreement to sell, there would
seem to be little about the execution of such an instrument
that would vouch for the intent of the parties to establish
rights or interests by such instructions. In the case of the
joint bank account, the depositor's concern relates to the
fund which is the bank account. In the case of escrow
instructions, the vendor signing such papers does not
necessarily relate his acts to the fund or proceeds due
under the contract from the purchaser, but could be
expected to associate his acts with the completion of a
transaction without special concern for the impact which
language in the escrow instructions might have on the
proceeds due him from the purchaser.
The Court's attention is directed to the widespread
use throughout this state of ecrow letters of instruction,
in printed form, which 1nake use of the tenn •• or the survivor," and which have been executed by numerous parties throughout the state whether or not they intend to
create a joint tenancy. Appellant suggests that the reason
for such language in the escrow instructions, in the case
of 1nultiple party sellers or buyers, is to authorize the
esrrow agent to deal with either such party without suspending such transactions pending the appointment of an
adn1inistrator in the event of the death of one of the
sellers or buyers.

111

To sustain the decision of the court below would, as
this ease. have the effect of creating joint tenancies

24
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umh·r circumstan<'l'S where there was no intention of
,·n·ntin~ ~uch by the parties executing the escrow instructions .

.\ppt>llant sub1nits that the instant case demon~tratP~ why tlw law does not favor joint tenancies. In
thi~ ca~e, the court below found that the instructions created a joint tenancy and that Mrs. Allred, upon the death
of her husband, was entitled to waive payment for what
had been substantially all of the property which had been
his prior to the agreement and execution of the escrow
instructions. The agreement of sale of May 27, executed
only four days before, made no reference to the intent of
Janws to create a joint tenancy between himself and his
wife. Appellant asserts that the policy of the law which
requires a clear expression of intent to create a joint
tPnancy would be violated by a ruling that the letter of
1'8e.row instructions was sufficient to create a joint tenaney.

It is worth noting that the language of the letter of
instructions, •'to us or the survivor of us" can be given a
reasonable 1neaning other than the creation of a joint
tenancy. ).[r. and :Jirs. Allred each owned certain tracts
of land as their separate property and they owned other
land in joint tenancy. Both the separate and jointly held
land were included in the agreement of sale. Thus, the
language ••to us or the survivor of us" may have been intt·nded as an instruction to the escrow agent to deliver
the particular deeds deposited when the vendee had Inade
full payment to each vendor for the amount due for the
tracts owned separately, i.e., "to us" and when full payment had also been 1nade for the jointly held property,
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which, in the event of the death of either could be made
to .the other, i.e., "or the survivor of us." Such a construction would seem justified in in this case, since the nature
of the writing does not seem to satisfy the policy requiring a high degree of certainty of intent.
· The court below erred in concluding frmn the findings that the letter of instruction created a joint tenancy
because the four unities necessary for existence of a
joint tenancy did not exist. 14 Am. Jur. "Cotenancy"
Section 7 expresses the require1nent as follows:
"In order to constitute a joint tenancy, four
requisites must exist, namely: the tenants must
have one and the same interest; the interests must
accrue by one and the same conveyance; they
must commence at one and the same time; and
the property must be held by one and the same
undivided possession. In other words, there must
be four unities: (1) unity of interest, (2) unity
of title, (3) unity of time, and ( 4) unity of possession. If any one of these ele1nents is lacking,
the estate will not be one in joint tenancy."
The court below found that, as a result of the agreeInent of ~fay 27, 1958, and the application of the doctrine
of equitable conversion, James and Isabell Allred held
interests as tenants in common to the proceeds due under
that contract. Assu1ning for the sake of the immediate
argument, that the doctrine of equitable conversion is applicable, there is nothing in the operation and legal effect
of the doctrine that would create a tenancy in common
between James F. and Isabell Allred in the proceeds of
the sales contract. Such doctrine would merely change
the nature of the property interest of the grantors from
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real estatP to personalty. X othing about the doctrine
would create a tenancy in cmmnon. Grantors included
both separately owned and jointly owned property in a
single contract of sale, and did so without including a
provision for distributing the portion of the total contract price due for each tract of real estate. No language
that would indicate an intention to create a tenancy in
common was included in the agremnent of sale.
The court below apparently used their failure to allocate the respective amounts due each as the basis for
concluding that a tenancy in conunon was created. Appellant sub1nits that this was error. In respect to the propPrty held by James Allred and Isabell Allred separately,
the only effect of equitable conversion would be to convt'rt each particular tract of land into an interest in personalty. Their failure to apportion the proceeds does
not create a tenancy in comnwn, since in that case it
would have been necessary to decide that they both had
a right to take possession of the whole contract price.
~uch a unity of possession is essential to the existence
of a tenancy in cmnrnon. 14 Arn. Jttr . .. Cotenancy" Section 16 states :
.. Unlike the joint tenancy, the tenancy in comInon is characterized by a single essential unitythat of possession, or of the right to possession,
of the cmnmon property. If such unity exists,
there is a tenancy in comn1on irrespective of any
other unities; and if it does not exist the estate
is not a tenancy in common."
Since J a1nes and Isabell Allred have an imn1ediate
right to a separate part of the purchase price, the unity
of possession does not exist in this case. To hold that
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a tenancy in common was created by the failure to allocate the purchase price would be to substitute the immediate right of both James and Isabell to bring an action
to ·establish their individual part of the contract price
with the common law rule requiring the consent of the
owners for a division or in the alternative, an action in
equity to sever the interests.
If the operation of the doctrine of equitable conYersion could not have resulted in the creation of a tenancy
in common between James and Isabell Allred, then a
fortiori the letter of instructions to the escrow agent
could not have created a joint tenancy.
POINT THREE

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
LETTER OF ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS CONSTITUTED AN
ATTEMPTED TES'TAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY AND WAS THEREFORE INVALID.

· The following language appeared in the escro"T instructions :
"2. In the event said Purchasers shall fail to pay
any of the installments provided for in that
certain Agreement bearing date the 27th day
of May, A. D. 1958, promptly and when due,
then upon our written demand, you shall return to us all of said papers and documents,
whereupon your duties, responsibilities and
liabilities of every kind and character, under
the terms of this Escrow, shall cease and
terminate."
It appears from the transcript, though counsel for
Isabell Allred did not include this n1atter in the amend-
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uwnt to tlw original findings as ht• was directed by the
Court to do, that the Court below Blade a finding that
therP was $1000.00 delinquent under the contract at the
tinw JumP~ F. Allred died, that being the pay1nent due
from Defendants approxilnately three Inonths prior to
.lamPs Allred's death. Under the terms of the escrow
dt•}wsit, after the paYJnent became delinquent James F.
Alln·d had a right to demand that the escrow agent return the deeds. Thus, James Allred had, prior to and
at the time of his death, the right after such default to
recall the deeds deposited with the escrow agent. His
power to control the disposition of the deeds until his
death, rendered the deposit of the deeds with the escrow
agent a conditional deposit. Based on the determination
that the escrow deposit was conditional it would seem
to follow that the delivery by the escrow agent, being
subject to the direction of J runes Allred until his death,
was not a delivery irrevocably effective prior to the death
of J runes ~-\.llred. The conclusion would seem inevitable
that the deed, which was eventually delivered to the
defendants was in the nature of a testamentary deed and
invalid as a testamentary disposition.
The court in Dixon v. Dameron's Ad1ninistrator, 256
Ky. 1:2:2, 77 ~.\Y. (2d) 6, defined a testamentary disposition as follows :
"It n1ust be ambulatory in its nature and revocable at the will of the maker."
In the case of Juneau v. Dethgens, 200 VVis. 360, 228
X.\r. 496, the court in considering a land contract which
provided for payment in installments and contained a
clause to the effect that on the death of the vendor the
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"'vhole of this contract is assigned without any further
payments or consideration and the title thereof passed
to the (purchaser) in fee simple," held that this provision
was testamentary in character and that it could be revoked by a subsequent will n1ade by the vendor.
By its own terms the escrow instructions, used by tht>
court below to create a joint tenancy, was subject to
termination in the event the grantees defaulted on their
payments, which default was found to have occurred here.
Since the power to control any interest arising under
the instructions was retained by James Allred such right
passed on to his estate or else created an interest in another taking effect at his death. If the latter, it must follow that the escrow instructions constituted a testamentary disposition and was therefore invalid for failure to
comply with the statutory forn1alities for wills. (See Section 74-1-5, UCA 1953)
The letter of escrow instructions further contains the
following:
"3. In the event both of us shall depart this life
during the term of this contract, then upon
satisfactory proof being made to you that
both of us are deceased, all payments thereafter due are to be abated and you are to
make delivery, to the purchasers, all of said
papers and instruments as though the purchase price had been paid in full."
Appellant submits that the above clause attempts to
create a future estate in the grantees, subject to the
interest of grantors during their lifetime. Without trying
to label the future interest created by the escrow instructions, it see1ns clear that the grantees haye the possibility
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of obtaiuing the legal title to the propP.rty by paying con:-;iderably less than the original contract price. It would
seem that the contingent estate attempted to be created
hy the escrow instructions is not related to any terms of
the contract in which the defendants agreed to purchase
the fee title. Such contingent estate is intended to take
(\ffect after the death of James Allred, which is a necessary condition precedent thereto, regardless of whether
he is or is not survived by his wife. It is without consideration and could also be terminated at the will of Mr.
Allred, after any default occurred, at all time until his
death. For this reason, the estate is created by the event
of his death, and is therefore an interest in real proptorty created by a testamentary disposition, and invalid.

Appellant conceeds that the contingent estate created
the escrow instructions would be valid if J atnes Allrl'd had, by an intervivos transfer, irrevocably created
the future interest in the defendant, even though making
it subject to a life estate in the survivor. Likewise, it is
conceded that such an interest could validly have been
ereated by a will confor1ning to the statutory technicalitie~. Appellant subtnits, however, that atten1pted use
of the escrow instructions to create a future interest, as
herein atte1npted, is invalid, since no future interest is
irrevocably created prior to J an1es Allred's death.
h~·

'r

e therefore submit that the letter of escrow in:-:tructions is an attempted testrunentary disposition because it has the effect (if the trial court's detennination
i~ sustained) of creating a joint tenancy between J mnes
.-\..llred and Isabell Allred to take effect upon death and
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fendants. Appellant 1naintains that an escrow instruction should not be allowed to becon1e a device whereby a
person can transfer, at death, property as a gift, by
retaining the right to recall the escrow until death; although by not doing so, the escrow instruction would become a basis for a survivorship right in smneone elsr.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion Appellant submits that the lower court
erred in applying the doctrine of equitable conversion
in this case with no findings of fact to support or justify
the same and further in concluding from the Findings
of Fact as made that a joint tenancy was created between
James F. Allred and his wife Isabell by the letter of
escrow instructions. The trial court should have determined that upon the death of James F. Allred his interest in the property and the proceeds thereafter payable
under the contract passed to his heirs, subject to prohate, and that his Estate has the right to exercise any
forfeiture provision contained in the contract for default
on the part of the Defendants; that Plaintiff in Intervention could not waive the provisions of the contract
or the escrow instructions and therefore that the delivery
of the instruments of conveyance should be rescinded and
the Defendants directed to reconvey the property.
Respectfully submitted,
DUANE A. FRANDSEN
Price, Utah
ARTHUR H. KIELSEN
510 Newhouse Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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